INTRODUCTION
The stock symbols of Scotland and Scottishness are all too familiar. Living in Scotland one becomes almost numb to the drone of bagpipes and kilts, heather and kailyards, Nessie and Braveheart--the low hum of 'cultural sub-nationalism' that has so perturbed Tom Nairn (1977) and others over the years. As an American with an academic interest in Scotland and nationalism ii I have often found myself straining to draw peoples' attention away from these symbols and towards others I have found more telling for understanding contemporary nationalist demands in Scotland, such as Covenants and Claims of Right (Hearn 1998; 2000) .
It is striking that if one surveys the academic books, political magazines, and campaigning group literature concerned with the home rule cause in Scotland over the last two decades, one of the most persistent images one encounters in photos and graphic art is of a Greek Parthenon-like structure, familiar to Edinburghers as the facade of the Old Royal High School aside Calton Hill. Hardly your garden variety kitsch. Few outside of Scotland, perhaps even outside the central belt of Scotland, would anticipate this. This observation provides the germ of the ideas explored here. There are particular historical reasons for this image's prominence, which I will discuss below, but I will be arguing that its selection as a key symbol of recent Scottish Nationalism is also due to ideological processes more generally bound up with the meanings of urbanism and nationalism in the modern era.
2 I aim to explore the relationships between political symbolism, civic nationalism, and urbanism in the Scottish context, putting forward three interrelated arguments. Firstly, despite the often rural and pre-modern imagery of nationalist discourses, the idea of the 'city' is central to nationalism, especially in its more 'civic' and 'liberal' varieties. Secondly, the historical and political development of urban Scotland, both its cities and towns, provide an important key for understanding nationalism and national identity in Scotland. And finally, the need to represent Scottish nationalism as a civic nationalism has led in practice to a privileging of the symbolism of the Edinburgh cityscape in recent Scottish nationalist discourse. Thus I try to examine why Edinburgh has been unusually suited, both by its appearance and history, to providing the key symbols of Scotland's civic nationalism.
THE CITY AS SYMBOL OF THE NATION
Nationalisms notoriously derive their key symbols not from urban contexts but from the countryside and a distant, pre-modern past (cf. Frykman and Löfgren 1987; Swedenburg 1990 ). This is part of why peasant ways of life, folk customs and beliefs, were a central concern among early ethnologists in Europe during the heyday of nation-state formation.
The pious peasant in the natural landscape frequently stood for the integrity and wholesomeness of the nation. In Europe heroes from medieval episodes have provided stock figures for embedding projects of national liberation and consolidation in a mythic past.
Scotland has no shortage of these kinds of symbols. Nationalist lore is full of quaint imagery of rustic highlanders amid the heathered glens, and the likes of William Wallace (a.k.a.
'Braveheart', a.k.a. Mel Gibson) fighting off the predatory English, broadsword in hand. But these rural and ancient symbols are precisely of the blatant, 'out front' variety that I want to suggest are not adequate for a fuller understanding of nationalist symbolism. Refocusing our gaze on the cityscape may help us make a useful analytic shift.
We should remember that nationalist thought has a winding genealogy. The ideas we encounter today are an amalgam of different ideological elements laid down over the last Adam Smith, all referred back to accounts of small, democratically self-governing polities as models for critiquing the absolutist monarchical state and formulating visions of a new kind of political order either suited to, or as a bulwark against, the deep economic transformation
Europe was undergoing (Viroli 1997; Haakonssen 1995; Yack 1992: 35-88) . Thus it was the ancient city-state that supplied the first metaphor for imagining the still forming nation-state (Anderson 1996: 20) , and many intellectuals of the day envisioned an ideal world of small self-governing states, seeing the polis as the proper size for effective (though often highly restricted) democracy (Ibid.: 111-113). As Tom Nairn observes:
Geneva was also the inspiration of the most radical of these thinkers, Rousseau. In 1746 the Republic of Genoa had regained its independence and the astonishing deeds of its People's Assembly were the talk of polite Europe. Thus, not long before the great revolutions which led to nation-building, it was by no means obvious that citystates were finished and small or micro-states obsolete (Nairn 1997: 127) .
As is well known, a second wave of nationalist thought developed in the later nineteenth century, as political and economic transformation moved eastward through Europe. This strain rejected enlightenment universalism, and was informed instead by romantic essentialisations of language, culture, and later "race" (Hobsbawm 1992) . The legacy of these two waves for contemporary theorisations of nationalism has been an enduring tendency toward dichotomous typologies opposing various forms: eastern and western (Kohn 1967) , primordial and civic (Geertz 1963) , ethnic and civic (Greenfeld 1992) , cultural and political (Chatterjee 1993; Hutchinson 1987) , illiberal and liberal (Brown 1999) .
iii For those interested in cultural processes, the ethnic (cultural, primordial, etc.) dimension of 4 nationalism can hold a special fascination, and is often privileged as defining the true or deeper reality of nationalism. I question this view, and argue instead that this highly variable phenomenon is best investigated by keeping in mind these ideological tensions that have been historically built into the process. It is probably more useful to observe how these different dimensions are manifested within and between various cases of nationalism, and then seek explanations for this variability.
Scotland provides an instance of what has been called neo-nationalism (Nairn 1975; McCrone 1998: 125-148) , that is, nationalist movements happening within the liberal democracies of the industrialised West, Catalonia and Quebec being the two other most frequently cited examples (Keating 1997; Guibernau 1999) . In general, these movements are seen as characterised by their primarily parliamentary paths to greater self-government and their extensive roots in civil society. Moreover, they are associated with relatively prosperous regions, and cities within those regions (Edinburgh, Barcelona, Montreal), and with strategic concerns about modes of integration into developing supra-national bodies such as the European Union and NAFTA. While hardly devoid of ethnic dimensions and conflicts, particularly around language issues in Catalonia and Quebec, they are often taken as exemplars of the more civic and liberal forms that nationalism can take under certain circumstances.
Of course people in Scotland, especially activists in the home rule cause, are well aware of the conceptual tensions outlined above, and of the bad reputation that attaches to 'ethnic nationalism'. Not surprisingly, they make considerable effort to assert and highlight the civic and liberal character of nationalism in Scotland. My argument is that this leads to a selective bias towards the vocabulary and imagery of classic, civic nationalism, with its emphasis on the city and the city-state. In an era in which democracy and the legitimacy of the modern state are commonly seen as having been weakened by processes of globalisation, arguments for new forms of government calibrated to a smaller scale have a renewed potency 5 (Seligman 1995; Offe and Preuss 1991; cf. Petersen 1990) , and the urban world plays an integral role in how this is imagined.
URBAN SCOTLAND: PROCESS AND IMAGE
Scotland was exceptional in its rapid population growth and urbanisation in the nineteenth century. From 1800 to 1900 the population grew from about 1.5 million to about 4.5 million, levelling off in the twentieth century, peaking just over 5 million mid-century. In 1801 the four cities--Glasgow, Edinburgh, Dundee and Aberdeen--contained 11 per cent of the population, a proportion that had grown to 35 per cent by 1901 (Gordon and Dicks 1983: 8) .
Around these core cities there was parallel growth in two types of towns, in the industrial satellite towns chiefly in the west (e.g. Paisley, Kilmarnock, Motherwell, Airdrie, Coatbridge), and to a lesser degree in the towns that provided services and markets for the agrarian regions (e.g. Perth, Inverness, Dumfries) (Checkland and Checkland 1989: 50-51 'While the private landlord was responsible for about ninety per cent of all dwellings in 1900, by 1990 this had shrunk to six percent' (Devine 1996: 11) . Urban governance of the twentieth century welfare state now fell largely into the hands semi-professional local politicians operating within a modern party framework, functioning especially as public landlords (but still with important traces of middle class professional voluntary participation through various voluntary non-departmental public bodies).
A proper perspective on the recent past is always more difficult, but one might want to argue that Scotland headed into a new phase in the 1970s, with the 'right to buy' chipping away the better quality public housing stock, local government powers and budgets substantially reduced, a new trend toward rural (non-agrarian) repopulation in the northern highlands and Skye, and the more equalised distribution of the urban population alluded to above, caused partly by the decanting of the urban poor from the major cities after World War Two, but no doubt also partly due to older towns now functioning both as centres for often ailing local industries and services, and as 'bedroom communities' for city commuters. The recent withdrawals of some local authorities from COSLA, and the Scottish Executive's call for a 'review of cities' possibly leading to proposals for new unified 'city regions' (Scott 2001) further suggest fundamental realignments of urban power are underway. Let me take this sketch of Scottish urban processes and play it off against representations of urban Scotland. It has often been noted that an important part of the iconography of Scotland, its self-image, has been drawn neither from rural peasant life, nor from the big cities, but from the small-to-mid-sized towns (Harvie and Walker 1990; McCrone n.d.; McPherson 1983) . The most notorious manifestation of this tendency has usually been located in the kailyard literature popular around the 1890s, which celebrated small town life and values, wrapping these in a mawkish sentimentality, and catering to a combination of Scottish middle classes and expatriates abroad (Devine 1999: 296-297) . But there are some grains of truth beneath the cringing stereotype. Two key institutions of Scottish middle-class governance in the nineteenth century, which often figured prominently in these stories, were the Kirk and the parish school. It was in the towns that these pillars of civic authority were often the most effective, their efforts at social betterment and social control being more frustrated in the burgeoning cities. Thus for the Scottish middle classes the towns probably The authors go on to suggest that the Scottish popular press of the period spoke to those many people whose lives in the city were often shadowed by the recent memory of a small-town or rural existence, and to those whose mobility to and from the city perhaps induced an ambiguous sense of identity or a complex set of loyalties regarding Place (1990: 343) . McPherson's specific aim here is to better understand the endurance and dissemination of the egalitarian, meritocratic myths of the 'lad o' pairts' in Scotland, but more generally he sheds light again on why the small town figures so prominently in Scotland's self-image. One suspects the study of similar careers by other middle-class professionals might tend to enhance this account.
What all this suggests is that amid the intense urbanisation of roughly 1850-1950 the Scottish town provided the symbolic paradigm of social and moral stability through which the dominant middle classes and 'self-bettering' working classes often imagined their world. A world where modern industry and professionalism were present, but not overwhelming, allowing the space for effective, liberal self-government. Some Scottish intellectuals such as Patrick Geddes consciously addressed these changes, attempting to conceptualise a synthesis of rural and urban life that was more balanced (Harvie and Walker 1990; Watson 1996: 287 Scotland was a modern and progressive society that it could dispense with the encumbrance of having its own parliament, and enter into this larger project of British Empire, seen as the modern carrier of civilisation. Architecturally, the classical revival was the prime expression of this ethos. While the gothic revival of the nineteenth century, so popular south of the border, had some presence in Scotland, particularly in regard to structures with spiritual and romantic associations, such as churches, the country houses of the gentry, and the Scott Monument, it was the more severe Greek style that continued to inform civic structures associated with government, education, the arts, and sciences. It was a style that expressed the rationalism and austere liberalism of the governing classes of eighteenth-and nineteenthcentury Scotland, especially in Edinburgh.
Interestingly, just as the bucolic image of small town Scotland persisted as an important part of its self-identity throughout the throws of industrialisation, it is only with the onset of deindustrialisation that the image of Scotland as rooted the urban cityscape becomes fully normalised, the story that Scotland tells itself about itself. Roderick Watson (1996) has traced the evolution of themes in Scottish literature across the twentieth century, highlighting a shift from the rural, Celtic and 'metaphysical,' to the urban, working class and 'realist'.
Around World War Two, partly through the stimulus of the Glasgow Unity Theatre, the latter set of themes begin to develop, but they do not really come into their own until the 1970s (I think a similar case could be made for representations in television and film). William
McIlvanney's iconic novel of urban working class life, Docherty, was published in 1975, but set around 1906, and his novel of the collapse of that way of life and its communal ethos some eighty years later, The Big Man , was published in 1985 (Ibid.: 301). Thus, just as the small town provided an image of community throughout the era of the industrial city, the urban tenement becomes the symbolic locus of solidarity, as cities are reshaped to provide more services, and make less things. Once again, Minerva's owl takes flight at dusk.
SYMBOLISM OF THE EDINBURGH CITYSCAPE
Because my research has been on the nationalist movement in Scotland my main focus in the following section is on the symbolisation of the nationalist cause in and through urban contexts, and not simply on the symbolisation of the nation. These two, the nation as an 'imagined community' in Benedict Anderson's phrase (1991) , and 'nationalism' as a political project, are related but distinct (Calhoun 1997: 6) . In the former the greater emphasis is on symbolising solidarity, while in the latter, it is on symbolising protest and objectives. Moreover, my interest is primarily in the process of political and moral rhetoric, with how symbols get used in a process of pursuing change (Austin 1962; Burke 1950; Fernandez 1986 ). I am less concerned with a more Durkheimian tradition in which symbols are studied primarily for their ability to represent, and make conceivable, social wholes (Durkheim and Mauss 1967; Geertz 1973; Lincoln 1989) . These distinctions, schematic as they are, raise certain questions. In that nationalist politics in Scotland has a strong socialist strain, and has been very concerned with re-establishing Scotland's economic viability in a changing global economy, one might think that Glasgow's working class and industrial glory would offer the most dominant set of symbols for nationalism today. As already indicated, it does provide powerful images and stories, but these do not necessarily serve to characterise the movement as a whole. During an early trip to Scotland in preparation for field work, an officer of the SNP shared with me a campaign leaflet used by Alex Neil in a recent Glasgow Central local election, which paired him with Jim Sillars, characterising them as the 'New Clydesiders' thus attempting to capitalise on the romantic working class imagery of the Red Clydeside. This failed to capture the imaginations of the voters of Glasgow Central. To some degree this is because the Labour Party, despite its modernising, has a prior and more plausible claim to such symbolism; it is also because Scotland is rapidly changing, from a heavy industrial to high tech and service sector economy with a feminising work force, for whom such rhetoric may not have the same pull. On the other hand, one might also expect that Edinburgh, with its reputation for anglification, might be an especially poor symbolic resource for a social movement that seeks increased autonomy from England. And yet, as we will see, Edinburgh has proven to be fertile ground for nationalist symbolism.
Glasgow versus Edinburgh
I want to suggest that there are other processes at work, that also help account for why Edinburgh images often dominate nationalist discourse. While Scottish nationalism is politically left-of-centre, inclined toward a somewhat more socialist and redistributive conception of the modern state (Bennie et al. 1997:138-139) , it is also social democratic, with a strong emphasis on the democratic. This is not to concede the notion that Scottish culture is by nature more democratic and egalitarian than that of the English (cf. Davie 1981; McCrone, et al. 1982; Hearn 2000: 139-154) . Rather, it is to draw attention to the fact that the central goal of the movement has been to effect an institutional change in the structures of democratic government, first and foremost by establishing a new parliament. Scottish autonomist discourse is saturated with terms such as 'civic, civil society, democratic, constitutional,' etc.. While issues of class antagonism are involved in this political process, they are primarily latent--as they tend to be within the dynamics of all modern technocratic and bureaucratic states (Habermas 1973) . The dominant language of Scottish nationalism is one of constitutional reform, and this tends to select and emphasise symbols that bring out this theme. In a time when socialism and explicitly class-based politics are in disarray, even though these are close to the hearts of many activists in the Scottish home rule movement, the lore associated with them provides less effective symbols. Instead, correcting Scotland's 'democratic deficit' by strengthening its voice as a polity has been seen as in line with recent events in Eastern Europe surrounding the collapse of the Soviet Union (e.g., the Solidarity movement in Poland, the 'peaceful divorce' of the Czech and Slovak republics, the independence of the Baltic states). In this context, it is the 'Athens of the North' rather than the 'Workshop of the World' that provides the most compelling symbols. on schisms within the Kirk in the 1700s and 1800s, and the Great Disruption of 1843 so divided it that it was permanently weakened in it role as a hegemonic social institution.
New Meanings for Old
Nonetheless, The Church of Scotland is still the National Church, and a steady and respected voice in public affairs, despite the general secularisation of Scottish culture in line with similar trends throughout Europe. Moreover, the Kirk has tended to conform to the corporatist and social democratic tendencies of British politics in this century, broadly aligning its spiritual mission with the social mission of the welfare state.
To this historical sketch we must add one of structure. The Scottish Presbyterian Church contrasts with the Church of England in its political and decision making structure. Instead of a hierarchy of Bishops appointed at various levels by those above, it relies on a process of nomination of representatives from below, to the Parish Kirk Session, to the Presbyteries, to the Synods, and finally up to the level of the General Assembly. In practice this tended to produce an oligarchic structure in which male members of local elites dominated at various levels. Even so, the logic of the basic structure of governance and decision making is more democratic, as many in Scotland would hasten to point out.
Enter Margaret Thatcher. In May of 1988, attempting to consolidate her troubled leadership of the Tory Party, and improve her always poor public image in Scotland, she went North to give some speeches. Her address to the General Assembly in Edinburgh has gone down in infamy as the 'Sermon on the Mound.' --an event frequently referenced in Scottish nationalist discourse. In short, Ms. Thatcher sought to lecture Scotland on the congruence of Christian faith and free market capitalism. To this end she cited Paul in Thessalonians: 'If a man shall not work, he shall not eat...' (Mitchell 1990: 119) , emphasising the call to The ministers and elders of the Kirk were not impressed. As James Mitchell describes:
Having listened to the Prime Minister, though only after five Kirk Ministers objected to her presence, the Moderator presented her with copies of two reports, "Housing Scotland's People" and "Just Sharing." Both were highly critical of government policies and involved a radically different interpretation of the social and economic meaning of Biblical texts (1990: 120).
Another observer notes that partly in response to this event,
In 1989 the Kirk's Church and Nation Committee produced a report that attacked the 'elective dictatorship' of the Westminster parliamentary system and issued a call to arms: "From a Scottish constitutional and theological perspective this English constitutional tradition of state absolutism has always been unacceptable in theory. It is now intolerable in practice." (Marr 1992: 33) .
These responses indicate how the Kirk served to articulate Scottish public opinion on, and rejection of, Thatcherism. The 'Sermon on the Mound' has become a dramatic event situated in a symbolically laden place, associated with long-term institutional conflicts between Scotland and England, that effectively summarises a major strain of Scottish sentiment regarding social democracy, political autonomy, and the dissent from neo-conservatism. (Guibernau 1999: 43-44) . Nationalism there appears to have been domesticated. This is very much the kind of future that the Scottish Labour Party would like to bring about for Scotland, and the SNP.
In the meantime, the new legislature has required a temporary home to conduct its business, and the Church of Scotland has obliged by leasing the General Assembly on The Mound, which has been combined with some nearby but inadequate government office space. So somewhat ironically, while the Greek classicism of the Royal High School has been rejected, and the modernism of Miralles' design has not yet arrived, the parliament finds itself housed in a Gothic church structure, vaguely reminiscent of Westminster. But as the confrontation between Margaret Thatcher and the General Assembly attests, claiming this space for Scottish government, even temporarily, has a certain symbolic savour.
To reiterate an earlier point, we need to look at symbols in process, as part of the construction of larger political and moral arguments. It seems to me that the examination of urban symbolism brings with it the risk of becoming fixated on the stability and concreteness of the features of the urban landscape. Here I have tried to focus on how various places, already significantly situated in both physical and conceptual 'landscapes', have acquired new meanings through new uses within those contexts. Moreover, I am trying to illustrate that nationalist symbolism in these instances is not simply a matter of representing a group identity, but rather articulates with the concrete concerns and agenda of movement activists, namely alterations in the structures of governance, for which civic symbolism is highly salient. The three examples discussed above highlight institutional contexts--the Old Royal
High School, the General Assembly, the Vigil--in which people came together to discuss and debate common concerns, in a Scottish way, in an urban setting. The city has long been a central metaphor for this conception of the ideal political community, as the 'Athens of the
North' continues to demonstrate.
CONCLUSION
Various strains of thought and practice feed into the symbolising of civic nationalism in Scotland. As I have tried to suggest, the ways symbols become attached to meanings is historically contingent in some respects, but powerfully determined in others. It is also the case that symbols do not work by logical argument, but by facilitating dense clusters of associations and meanings that steer our thoughts rather than persuading our critical faculties. With this in mind, three themes seem to arise out of the vignettes sketched above.
Firstly, ideas of democracy and republicanism are evoked by the backdrop of Athenian architecture and its associations, and by the association of various decision-making fora--the putative parliamentary chamber in the Old Royal High School and the proposals for a 24 shadow senate, the General Assembly of the Kirk, the small group gathered around the Vigil's 'flame'. Secondly, the Edinburgh cityscape in the round, with its monumental attire, connotes the concrete historical tradition of civil self-government in Scotland reaching back into the nineteenth century. Then the power to govern through cities and towns was widely felt to be sufficient, today a national parliament is commonly considered necessary as well, but changing aims does not undo the connections of civic tradition.
Finally, and somewhat in tension with these first two themes, there is the perennial theme of nationalism: modernisation. Edinburgh is a receptacle of civic tradition, but it is also conveniently symbolically detached from the weight of the immediate industrial past and ensuing industrial decline. It evades the 'Glasgow problem'. There is a convenient hiatus between its eighteenth and nineteenth century splendour and the present, which in almost all nationalisms is oriented toward the future, toward progress. This is a tension summed up in the choice of Enric Miralles' design for the new parliament building. This core dilemma of nationalism has often been represented as its Janus-faced nature (Nairn 1977) , its need to lay claim to a deep and stable past in order to make viable claims to determine the nation's future. One thing this essay has tried to suggest is that it is not just nationalism, but urbanism as well that is Janus-faced--constantly negotiating the present and the future through visions of the past. The industrial city is imagined through the small town, the service oriented conurbation is filtered through life in the industrial tenement. 
